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ABSTRACT  
 
Using British workplace data we examine the relationship between 
human resource management (HRM) and different forms of employee 
voice. After controlling for observable establishment characteristics, we 
find voice and HRM are positively correlated, but this positive association 
is confined to certain voice regimes.  Previous research has found no 
association between HRM and union voice. However, distinguishing 
between union-only voice regimes and dual channel (i.e. union and non-
union) voice regimes reveals that union-only regimes have the lowest 
incidence and intensity of HRM adoption while dual channel regimes 
have the highest HRM incidence and intensity. The implications of these 









The relationship between the adoption of human resource management (HRM) 
techniques and the presence of unions has been a topic of considerable debate 
on both sides of the Atlantic for a number of years.  Early writers such as Guest 
(1989:48) emphasized the individual focus of HRM as damaging to collective 
organization, while others such as Kochan (1980) saw greater use of HRM 
techniques as part of an overt ‘union substitution’ strategy. Kochan and 
Osterman (1994), on the other hand, suggested HRM might work better in the 
presence of unions. Protagonists in the union versus HRM debate have often 
used different definitions of HRM and different measures of union presence, but a 
recent and comprehensive analysis of British data by Machin and Wood 
concluded that there is “no statistically significantly greater adoption of HRM 
practices in non-union workplaces than in unionized ones” (Machin and Wood, 
2005:216). 
 
The authors qualify their conclusions in two ways. First, they speculate on the 
possibility that their results are “uniquely British” and second they introduce the 
possibility that there may be “different reasons for introducing HRM practices in 
union and non-union environments” (2005:216). In this paper, we pursue these 
arguments further by distinguishing between union and non-union voice, 
considering their relationship to HRM separately and in combination.  This proves 
to be crucial in understanding the relationship between HRM and union voice in 
the UK context.  We argue that there may be something about the British context 
which delivers this idiosyncratic relationship between HRM and voice: we 
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develop this argument below, but in brief it rests on the ability of employers in 
Britain to combine union and non-union voice in ways that are not possible in the 
US. 
 
The structure is as follows. In the next section, we distinguish voice and HRM 
and speculate about their relationship. We then describe some distinctive and 
relevant features of the UK context. In the following section, we introduce our 
hypotheses about HRM and voice incidence. Next, we describe our data and 
methods and test our hypotheses. The final section summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
Voice and HRM 
 
Voice regimes are governance mechanisms for employment contracts 
(Williamson, 1991; Bryson et al 2004). They exist where institutions or processes 
are present to generate two-way communication between managers and 
employees. Voice regimes can be direct or representative in nature and can be 
delivered in a number of ways; via a union, through management led initiatives or 
as part of some dual channel where union and non-union voice are both present 
(Millward et al., 2000; Bryson, 2004). Our conception of employee voice is not, as 
was Freeman and Medoff’s (1984), based solely on unionism. Rather, it is closer 
to Hirschman’s (1971) conception, embracing any form of employee voice as 
Hirschman embraced any form of consumer voice: it is the institutionalization of 
two-way communication between employers and employees designed to reduce 
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transaction and exit costs for both parties. It is thus a contractual governance 
mechanism with mutual benefits. 
 
Voice regimes can also be accompanied by HRM practices. The specific 
practices that form part of any given HRM system can be quite diverse, but 
typically they involve managerial attempts to motivate and manage workers 
through a series of workplace practices rather than through strict command and 
control structures. HRM is a sophisticated set of control techniques designed to 
yield benefits to the firm by use of management–initiated techniques for people 
management designed to generate higher performance (Becker et al 2001).  
However, the effectiveness of these HRM techniques in improving organizational 
performance is contested (Godard 2004).   
 
The HRM practices we consider here are derived from Pfeffer (1995) and Storey 
(1992) and are discussed in detail below.  They may be related to voice regimes, 
but they are logically distinct.  Somewhat like mobile phones and cameras, voice 
and HRM may be encountered as integrated packages or separately.  They may 
confer different costs and benefits in different combinations and locations.  
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The UK Context 
 
Britain has historically experienced a ‘voluntarist’ industrial relations system 
granting the parties to industrial relations a considerable degree of freedom to 
choose their preferred or agreed institutional arrangements (Clegg, 1979). The 
two decades prior to the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (used 
here and described in more detail below) broadly coincided with the Thatcher era 
during which a further expansion of employer choice was generated by a series 
of deregulatory measures which reduced legal support for trade union activity 
(Willman and Bryson, 2007). Employers in the UK were therefore virtually 
unconstrained in the period up to 1998 in their ability to mix union and non-union 
voice at the establishment level.  This has made it possible for employers to 
supplement union with non-union voice without terminating relationships with 
unions (Willman and Bryson 2007).  This situation contrasts starkly with the USA 
where the legal system proscribes certain non-union voice and HRM practices in 
a union environment to preserve unions’ “sole agent” status (LeRoy, 2006).   
 
In spite of this variety in voice regimes, UK studies on the co-existence of HRM 
and voice focus almost exclusively on the links between HRM and union voice. It 
is usually assumed that HRM may substitute for unions since it offers alternative 
solutions to worker problems, thus challenging the solutions offered by unions 
and potentially reducing the incentive for union organizing.    There is evidence 
that HRM policies are associated with higher job satisfaction and a lower 
intention to quit (Guest and Conway, 1999) and that they reduce workers’ 
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expressed problems at the workplace in both Britain and the US, potentially 
limiting workers’ desire for union solutions (Bryson and Freeman, 2006).   
 
However, studies generally find that unionized workplaces differ little from non-
unionized workplaces in terms of the incidence of HRM (Wood, 1996; Wood and 
de Menezes, 1998; Machin and Wood, 2005) and – unlike in the USA – HRM 
practices do not reduce workers’ desire for unionization (Bryson and Freeman 
2006).1  Furthermore, one study using the same data employed in this paper 
found that a positive link between HRM practices and labor productivity was 
confined to unionized workplaces(Bryson et al., 2005), suggesting that 
unionization and HRM may even be complementary. Unions in the USA may 
challenge employer efforts to introduce HRM, aware of the potential for HRM to 
undermine worker support for unionization, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally (Fiorito, 2001; LeRoy, 2006).  These concerns, however, may not 
be so pertinent in the UK. 
 
Of particular relevance for our work is that all of the studies above do not take 
account of the heterogeneity of voice regimes in the UK.  In particular, they do 
not distinguish between non-union, union and dual channel (mixed union and 
non-union) voice regimes, presenting instead the effects of unionization on HRM 
across pure and mixed regimes, usually proxied by a dummy variable identifying 
                                                 
1
 Cully et al. (1999: 110-111) note that the higher incidence of HRM practices in unionized 
workplaces is largely due to their greater likelihood of being large and being in the public sector.  
Machin and Wood (2005) also present bivariate analyses indicating higher HRM incidence in 
unionised workplaces but, again, this association disappears when controlling for other factors. 
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workplaces in which at least one union is recognized for pay bargaining.  In fact, 
non-union forms of voice have become increasingly prevalent.Moreover, where 
union voice is present, it often co-exists with non-union voice (Bryson et al., 
2004).  Among unionized workplaces with 10 or more employees, six-in-seven 
had some form of non-union voice as well (see below).  
 
As in the USA, the union sector has been shrinking in the UK during the past 
three decades.  By 1998, around half the workplaces in the UK had voice 
mechanisms that were exclusively non-union.  These include direct and 
representative voice channels which are instigated by the employer, sometimes 
at the request of employees.2  To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence 
on the links between these various forms of voice and HRM either in the UK or 
the USA, in part because many authors’ measures of HRM subsume voice 




For our hypotheses, we adopt the following simple notation: Let HRM (X) be the 
extent of HRM use given voice regime X, where X can be: A (absence of 
                                                 
2
 EU legislation can require the setting up of works councils at the apex of larger organizations, 
but this does not affect workplace-level arrangements in the UK.  The Information and 
Consultation Directive which came into effect in April 2005, may have some effect on voice 
arrangements at workplace-level but this was not in place in the late 1990s. 
3
 There is one exception. Fenton-O’Creevy and Wood (2005) distinguish between union voice and 
direct and representative forms of non-union voice.  Using data on multinational companies with 
headquarters in Britain they find no support for the proposition that direct-voice only regimes have 
a higher incidence of high-commitment work practices than other voice regimes. 
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voice), U (use of union voice), and N (non-union voice). U and N can be 
present concurrently.  
 
A management control technique like HRM and a contractual governance 
mechanism like voice may be complementary or substitutes. If HRM practices 
delivered everything voice representation did (and vice versa), the two would be 
substitutes. In fact, since HRM techniques emerged much later than unions and 
other forms of voice representation, one could argue that HRM is a natural 
“successor” and firms will switch from voice to HRM eventually.  
 
On the other hand, if the effectiveness of HRM is enhanced by the simultaneous 
presence of voice at a workplace (e.g. because voice reduces costly worker exit 
or increases the flow of productivity-enhancing information), the two would be 
complements and we would expect them to appear together.  Concurrent use of 
voice and HRM could also originate from a common factor driving the adoption of 
both – for example managerial quality – that enables a firm to cope with 
organizational and managerial innovations more easily. In this case, we would 
again expect the two practices to appear in conjunction– a workplace that draws 
positive net benefits from one will also draw positive net benefits from the other. 




H1: HRM will be more prevalent in establishments with (any form of) voice than in 
those without voice (min[HRM(U), HRM(N), HRM(U,N)] > HRM(A)). 
 
Conditioning on workplaces with voice, HRM, may sit better with some forms of 
voice than others. HRM may substitute for union voice where HRM generates 
outcomes that reduce employee demand for unionization.  The presence of 
union-only voice may signal union success in monopolizing worker voice at the 
workplace and may imply the potential to block HRM too if the union is not 
persuaded of the ‘high performance’ ethos which drives HRM.  In addition, union-
only voice may imply a reliance on collective rather than individual forms of 
employer-employee engagement that might exclude HRM. Reliant on a narrower 
definition of union only voice (rather than union presence) we hypothesize, 
amending Machin and Wood (2005), that among voice regimes, HRM will be 
lowest in union-only voice regimes. 
 
Non-union voice only exists in the UK at workplace-level where the employer has 
chosen to invest in its provision (Bryson et al., 2004).4  The fact that the employer 
has chosen to implement non-union voice implies that the employer may also 
invest in HRM to obtain a competitive advantage as described by Pfeffer (1995). 
The presence of non-union voice alongside union voice at a workplace is 
indicative of one of two scenarios, both of which are conducive to HRM.  It may 
either signal union weakness which leaves the employer largely unconstrained in 
                                                 
4
 It is plausible that direct voice emerges spontaneously in the smallest of workplaces due to 
worker proximity.  However, these workplaces are absent from our data. 
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mixing voice varieties with HRM, or it may imply  a ‘mutual gains’ environment in 
which unions are willing to use what Freeman and Medoff (1984) termed their 
‘voice face’ to elicit productivity improvements.  Therefore, we hypothesize; 
 
H2: HRM will be higher in workplaces with non-union voice than in those with 
union only voice (min[HRM(N), HRM(U,N)] > HRM(U)). 
 
So far our hypotheses are consistent with the proposition that HRM incidence will 
increase in an ordinal fashion from no-voice to union voice to non-union voice 
regimes.  
 
Our main departure from previous work in this field is to stress the heterogeneity 
of union voice. Specifically, we identify dual voice as empirically more common 
than union only voice (Bryson et al 2004). If, as we hypothesize, union only voice 
environments restrict HRM and non-union only voice environments are a more 
favorable habitat, we must consider how dual voice and HRM will coexist. 
 
Whether a workplace is unionized is, in part, an accident of history: the earlier 
cohort of workplaces initially adopted union-voice whereas newer workplaces 
adopted non-union only voice (Machin, 2000; Millward et al., 2000; Willman et al., 
2007). Yet very few unionized workplaces have de-recognized their unions in 
Britain; instead, they have supplemented union with non-union voice (Millward et 
al., 2000; Kersley et al., 2006).   
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Dual voice regimes may have emerged in different ways. For some firms,  non-
union voice was added to union only regimes in response to employers 
perceiving deficiencies in union-only voice provision. The reverse is also 
possible, where employees pressed for unionization in addition to non-union 
consultation frameworks. In the UK, it is likely that the former has been more 
common.   
 
However, if union voice acts as a drag on the introduction of HRM, employers 
may switch to non-union voice. Where there were no constraints on doing so, 
adding non-union voice mechanisms to union ones is also a risk-averse strategy 
for overall voice improvement (Bryson et al 2004). It is thus likely that in 
continuing dual regimes, no such drag operates, and we therefore hypothesize; 
. 
H3: There will be no difference in HRM incidence and intensity between dual 
channel and non-union only voice regimes (HRM(U, N) = HRM(N)). 
 
To summarize, our hypotheses on the incidence of voice and HRM can be 
expressed in the following ordinal ranking:  
 
HRM(U, N) = HRM(N) > HRM(U) > HRM(A),  
 
 12 
where the first equality represents H3, the first inequality H2, and the second 
inequality H1. 
 
The Data and Context 
 
Our data are the British Workplace Employment Relations Surveys 1998 
(WERS98), a large-scale survey of industrial relations in British establishments in 
the public and private sectors.  The key features of these data are described 
elsewhere (Millward et al., 2000, 3-10; 248-55). Our analysis is based on data 
collected from human resource managers responsible for workplace industrial 
relations which contain the voice-related variables and HRM items needed for our 
analysis. All observations are weighted by the inverse of the workplace’s 
probability of selection for the survey. With these weights, our analyses provide a 
representative portrait of workplaces in Britain with 10 or more employees in 
1998. We now define our measures. 
 
Voice is defined as the presence of two-way forms of (representative or direct) 
communication between workers and management. In our data, the set of voice 
measures is as follows. 
1. union recognition 
2. union representatives on or off site 
3. a joint consultative committee meeting at least once a month 
4. non-union representatives on site 
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5. problem solving groups 
6. regular meetings between management and employees which allow for 
two-way communication 
7. team briefings that occur at least once a month and devote time to 
employees’ questions/views. 
Items 1-2 measure union voice. Items 3-7 measure non-union voice. No-voice 
workplaces are defined by the absence of all. 
 
The context and timing of the data collection are relevant to understanding the 
voice measures.  In 1999 the government enacted legislation which could require 
employers to recognize trade unions if the majority of workers so wished, hence 
our reliance on the 1998 dataset.  We thus have four categories of voice in our 
analysis: no voice, union voice only, non-union voice only and a mix of union and 
non union voice (termed ‘dual’).  The incidence of these regimes in our data was 
17, 5, 48 and 30 percent respectively. 
 
The HRM measures are broadly based on Pfeffer (1995). The measure is a count 
of practices identified by Pfeffer, supplemented by other aspects of human 




1. selectivity in recruiting: where manager says skills, qualifications, 
experience and motivation are all important factors in recruiting new 
employees 
2. job security: policy of guaranteed job security for at least some employees 
3. incentive pay: profit pay, performance related payments or cash bonuses 
4. employee share ownership scheme 
5. information sharing: management shares information on investment, 
financial position of the organization or staffing 
6. ‘empowerment’: core employees have a lot of control over variety in their 
work, discretion over how they do their work or control over the pace at 
which they do their work 
7. self-managed teams: core employees work in teams that are able to 
appoint their own leaders, jointly decide how work is done, or have 
responsibility for specific products or services 
8. on-going training: on-going training is one of the main methods by which 
core employees are made aware of their job responsibilities 
9. cross-training: at least some core workers are formally trained to do jobs 
other than their own 
10. symbolic egalitarianism: core employees have standard contracts for all 
non-pay terms and conditions of employment 




In addition to these items identified by Pfeffer the score includes two other items: 
12. an indicator that the workplace has a formal strategic plan, strategic 
planning being a key component of HRM (Storey, 1992) 
13. the existence of a widespread appraisal system, that is, where at least 
80% of core employees are formally appraised. 
 
A score of 13 denotes affirmative answers to each of these questions. Lacking 
any one of these HRM variables would give an establishment a score of 12 and 
so on.5 This summative measure of HRM differs from others in the literature, 
including Machin and Wood (2005) who, because they use earlier surveys as 
well as the 1998, must operate with a smaller set of HRM measures.  In addition, 
they include items such as the existence of a joint consultative committee that we 





Table 1 reports the incidence of voice by workplace characteristics in 1998. The 
percentage of establishments with some form of voice ranges from lows of 64 
and 67 percent in single-establishments and family owned operations 
                                                 
5
 Clearly, this is the simplest way of defining HRM intensity. Assigning different weights to each of 
these elements or using clusters of HRM practices does not fundamentally alter our conclusions 
(results available upon request). 
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respectively to a high of 100 percent in health establishments. The overall 
sample average for all establishments is 83 percent.   
[Table 1] 
The first indication of a positive correlation between voice and HRM is the higher 
incidence of voice in workplaces with high HRM scores (94 per cent among those 
with an HRM score of 9+) compared with workplaces with lower HRM scores (80 
per cent among those with scores of 8 or under).6  This relationship, which 
supports Hypothesis 1, is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 which shows the HRM 
score distribution for no-voice workplaces lies to the left of that for workplaces 
with voice. 
[Figure 1] 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the use of HRM practices, overall and 
disaggregated by workplace characteristics. In 1998, establishments used an 
average of 7 out of 13 HR practices. This overall figure differs considerably 
across workplaces with small, single-establishment, family owned, private sector 
and middle-aged establishments using fewer HRM practices than larger, non-
family owned, public sector, and younger or older establishments.  
[Table 2] 
Table 2 presents HRM scores by workplace characteristics.  It confirms that 
establishments with voice use more HRM practices. However, HRM intensity 
varies significantly across voice regimes. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, 
                                                 
6
 Since 1984, non-union only regimes have increased three-fold in the population of workplaces 
with 25 or more employees.  Union-only regimes have witnessed a similarly impressive decline 
over the same period (Willman et al, 2007).  
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union-only voice has the lowest HRM score amongst voice types. HRM scores 
are higher in dual channel and non-union only voice regimes.   
 
The distribution of HRM scores by type of voice regime is shown in Figure 2. The 
panels are ranked in terms of overall mean in the HRM score.  It is clear that 
union-only voice is associated with a compressed distribution of HRM scores 
(panel A). There are fewer outliers within the union voice type, with most 
workplaces located between 5 and 8 practices. In each panel the dotted line 
represents the overall frequency of scores. 
[Figure 2] 
Table 3 shows the incidence of each HRM practice by workplaces with and 
without voice.  Almost every practice is more likely to be found in a workplace 
that also has formal voice. The exception is the use of incentives, perhaps 
indicating a more transactional relationships in no-voice regimes. 
[Table 3] 
Table 4 presents the same set of 13 practices, only now we look at patterns 
within the voice sector. Establishments with dual voice have a greater likelihood 
than others of adopting almost all HRM practices, except for the compensation 
related (extrinsic) components, incentive pay and employee ownership schemes, 
where establishments with non-union only voice are more likely to use these two 
practices.  The biggest disparity between union-only voice regimes and other 
voice regimes is in relation to formal appraisal, internal promotion, selective 
recruitment and share ownership. The relative absence of these HRM practices, 
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together with the high incidence of information sharing and, to some degree, 
participation and empowerment, helps account for the compression of HRM 
practices in this sector.7  
[Table 4] 
The descriptive relationships presented here appear to confirm the three 
hypotheses.  However, it is possible that the relationships identified are driven by 
observable differences between voice and no-voice workplaces which are also 
correlated with the incidence of HRM.  For instance, Table 1 showed that the use 
of voice increases with establishment size, something that may also influence the 
costs and benefits of returns to HRM. We therefore test if these relationships 
change once we control for observable workplace characteristics. The results are 
presented in Table 5. 
[Table 5] 
Table 5 confirms many of the bivariate relationships identified in Table 1, such as 
the link between voice and establishment size.  It also,  confirms an independent, 
statistically significant relationship between HRM use and the presence of voice 
(row 1). 
 
Table 6 reports estimates of the association between varieties of voice and HRM 
adoption and intensity. In the first column are the results of a dummy variable, 
which uses a cut-off of 9 HRM practices to denote a high HRM score8. We then 
                                                 
7
 It is not surprising to see the high prevalence of HRM practices such as information sharing in 
union workplaces since these are often the object of union bargaining. 
8
  Other cut-offs were tried and results were not significantly different; results available upon 
request. 
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explore the robustness of these results to a change in dependent variable, where 
the HRM intensity score, as defined previously, is used. In column (2) the mean 
score was 6.89 and as our results are qualitatively the same in both columns, we 
will confine our interpretation of results to the more intuitive HRM score results.  
[Table 6] 
There is  strong support for our hypotheses regarding links between voice and 
HRM (Table 6, row 1).  Treated as a single entity, voice and HRM were positively 
correlated (Table 5), supporting our first hypothesis.  However, across voice 
regimes, HRM is least prevalent in union-only regimes (Table 6), confirming 
Hypothesis 2.  The difference between union-only regimes and those containing 
non-union voice is statistically significant. Indeed, controlling for observable 
differences across workplaces, HRM is no more prevalent in union-only regimes 
than it is in no voice regimes.  Thus, in accordance with Hypothesis 3, it is the 
voice regimes with some non-union voice present – either in isolation or in 
combination with union voice – where HRM is most apparent.  
 
Descriptive analyses indicated that dual channel voice regimes had a greater 
HRM incidence than non-union only voice regimes, However, although the HRM 
adoption coefficients are largest in dual channel regimes, these are not 
significantly higher than the coefficients in non-union only regimes in line with 
hypothesis 3.9  This suggests that the differences in the descriptive analysis were 
                                                 
9
 The 0.07 difference between non-union only and dual channel coefficients in the HRM score 
model has a t-statistic of 0.29. 
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partly attributable to observable differences between establishments with these 
regimes that are controlled for in the regression. 
 
For our other controls we find results in line with much of the associated literature 
on HRM adoption. Specifically, we find that: 
• Workplace size has a positive and significant effect on the number of HRM 
practices adopted;  
• Workplaces that are part of some multi-establishment network also adopt 
more HRM practices, with the number of those practices increasing with 
network size; 
• Age of establishment displays an inverted-U shape with workplaces aged 
3 to 4 years being the most intensive users of HRM, while those aged 
under 3 and more than 21 years have lower scores;  
• Organizational affiliations generally increase the use of HRM up to a point, 
as the highest category (4 affiliations) seems to make little difference. 





In the last two decades of the 20th Century unionization was in decline in Britian.  
Voice regimes, on the other hand, were not in decline since employers were 
substituting union voice with non-union voice  (Millward et al., 2000; Bryson et al., 
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2004).  At the same time, HRM practices were on the increase, although they 
remained far from ubiquitous. In their important contribution to the literature on 
union voice and HRM, Machin and Wood (2005) argued that there was no causal 
link between declining unionization and rising HRM. However, their time-series 
data means their study relies on a partial measure of HRM which conflates HRM 
and voice.  Furthermore, in keeping with the rest of the literature, they take no 
account of heterogeneity in voice regimes. This is the first paper to draw attention 
to the heterogeneity of union and non-union voice regimes and, in particular, the 
importance of dual channel voice regimes in understanding the links between 
HRM and unionization.  We find that, although union-only voice regimes and 
HRM do not easily co-habit, dual channel voice and HRM do.  This may go some 
way to explaining why despite union membership decline, large scale union de-
recognition has not occurred in Britain; dual channel employers simply did not 
need to get rid of unions in order to introduce HRM.  There is also no evidence of 
a switch to no-voice with HRM. Most of the decline in individual unionization was 
brought about by new workers entering new workplaces that had simply by-
passed the union voice solution.   
 
By using a richer conception of HRM than the previous literature and by 
analyzing both the incidence and intensity of HRM, we have shown that the 
intensity of HRM, its distribution and the relative frequency of its components 
differ across the union and non-union sectors and within the union sector.  In 
particular, financial incentives are less prevalent in the union sector whereas self-
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managed teams and information sharing are more prevalent in the union sector.  
Furthermore, dual channel regimes have more intensive HRM than union-only 
regimes and there is some compression in the distribution of HRM in the union-
only sector compared with the dual channel sector.  More ‘permissive’ legal and 
public policy arrangements obtain in the UK than the USA, making employer and 
worker choices more salient in determining voice and HRM outcomes. Although 
we can not directly answer Wood and Machin’s (2005: 216) question regarding 
the motivations for the use of HRM in the union and non-union sectors, we argue 
that these patterns are consistent with explanations which emphasize the 
heterogeneity of union voice regimes.   
 
The greater part of the union voice sector in the UK is also to a material degree 
non-union and this, we argue, explains much of the compatibility between unions 
and HRM. The clearest complementarity is between non union voice and HRM. 
Union-only voice regimes are more similar to no-voice regimes in their 
relationship to HRM. In this sense, the UK case may not be a good basis for 
generalization. Where employers face a straight choice between union or non-
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Table 1: Incidence of Voice (%) by Selected Workplace Characteristics, 1998 
 
1. All Workplaces  83.1 
2. By Sector  
Public 98.9 
Private services 80.8 
Private manufacturing 65.2 






1000 plus 96.5 
4. By Ownership  
Foreign 72.5 
Domestic 84.2 
5. By Establishment  
Single 70.7 
Multi-establishment 87.7 





7. By Set-up date  
Pre 1980 88.5 
Post 1980 78.5 
8. By Decade of Set-up date  
Pre 1980 -- 
1980s -- 
1990s -- 
9. By Establishment Age*  
<3 years 80.0 
3-19 years 82.1 
20+ years 86.1 
10. By Industry   
Manufacturing 68.5 
Electricity, gas and water 99.9 
Construction 70.5 
Wholesale and retail  83.3 
Transport + Communication 86.0 
Financial services 76.8 
Other business services 93.6 
Public administration 99.9 
Education 98.7 
Health 99.9 
Other community services 98.1 
11. By HRM Score*  
High [9-13] 93.6 
Low [0-8] 80.0 
12. By Ownership Structure*  
Family owned/controlled 66.5 
Other 88.8 
13. By Employer Association Status  
Yes 87.9 
No 82.9 















































Table 2: Average HRM Score (score 1 to 13) actual and normalized by selected 






1. All Workplaces  6.9 0.09* 
2. By Sector   
Public 7.45 6.22 
Private 6.71 -2.00 
3. By Establishment size (employees)   
10-24 6.6 -3.22 
25-49 6.94 0.56 
50-99 7.19 3.33 
100-199 7.59 7.78 
200-499 7.93 11.56 
500+ 8.05 12.89 
4. By Ownership   
Foreign 7.15 2.89 
Domestic 6.89 0.00 
Joint Venture  5.81 -12.00 
5. By Establishment   
Single 5.81 -12.00 
Multi-establishment 7.39 5.56 
6. By Size of Multi-Establishment Network   
Single 5.83 -11.78 
2-10 7.03 1.56 
11-50 6.87 -0.22 
51+ 7.98 12.11 
7. By Organization Size   
Small [<50] 6.60 -3.22 
Large [51+] 7.92 11.44 
8. By Establishment Age   
<3 years 6.44 -5.00 
3-19 years 7.20 3.44 
20+ years 6.64 -2.78 
9. By Industry    
Manufacturing 6.01 -9.78 
Electricity, gas and water 9.19 25.56 
Construction 5.11 -19.78 
Wholesale and retail 7.31 4.67 
Hotels and restaurants 6.56 -3.67 
Transport + Communication 7.10 2.33 
Financial services 8.65 19.56 
Other business services 7.14 2.78 
Public administration 7.17 3.11 
Education 7.42 5.89 
Health 7.15 2.89 
Other community services 5.56 -14.78 
10. By Ownership   
Family owned/controlled 5.93 -10.67 
Other 7.22 3.67 
11. By Employer Association Status   
Yes 6.80 -1.00 
No 6.88 -0.11 
12. By Number of Organisational Affiliations   
0 6.88 -0.11 
1 6.67 -2.44 
2 6.96 0.78 
3 7.08 2.11 
4 7.87 10.89 
13. By Franchise Status   
 29 
Franchise 6.77 -1.33 
Non-franchise 6.90 0.11 
14. By Type of Voice I   
No Voice 5.71 -13.11 
Union 6.41 -5.33 
Non-Union Only 6.86 -0.33 
Dual Channel 7.51 6.89 
15. By Type of Voice II    
No Voice 5.71 -13.11 
Representative Only 6.28 -6.78 
Representative and Direct 7.63 8.22 
Direct Only 6.75 -1.56 
 
Number of Observations 1929  
 
Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998.  *The figure 0.09 is the standard deviation 
























































2. Guaranteed Job Security 
 
7.2 10.9 10.3 
3. Selective Recruitment  
 
46.4 54.8 53.4 
4. Employee Ownership Scheme 
 
11.2 15.4 14.7 
5. Presence of Incentive Pay 
 
53.3 52.7 52.8 
6. Ongoing Training 
 
57.5 73.2 70.6 
7. Internal “Symbolic” Equity 
 
20.0 46.6 42.2 
8. Internal Promotion 
 
24.2 25.8 25.6 
9. Formal Appraisal System  
 
37.4 56.7 53.5 
10. Information Sharing 
 
57.5 73.2 79.9 
11. Self-Managed Teams 
 
62.6 77.5 75.0 
12. Job Enrichment 
 
61.2 70.1 68.6 
13. Participation and Empowerment 
 
69.9 59.5 61.1 







Notes: Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998. Numbers in parentheses refer to 



















Table 4: Incidence of HRM practices by type of workplace voice (%), 1998. 
 
 






















2. Guaranteed Job Security 
 
6.9 18.4 4.0 
3. Selective Recruitment  
 
48.5 67.2 41.1 
4. Employee Ownership Scheme 
 
16.8 14.4 8.3 
5. Presence of Incentive Pay 
 
61.3 41.2 39.4 
6. Ongoing Training 
 
72.1 75.0 67.7 
7. Internal “Symbolic” Equity 
 
41.9 53.7 49.7 
8. Internal Promotion 
 
26.5 26.5 16.1 
9. Formal Appraisal System  
 
59.9 53.8 42.5 
10. Information Sharing 
 
79.9 88.0 88.9 
11. Self-Managed Teams 
 
71.8 85.6 82.1 
12. Job Enrichment 
 
66.2 76.4 68.9 
13. Participation and Empowerment 
 
59.3 59.8 60.2 







Notes: Source: Data are for Britain using WERS data 1998. Numbers in parentheses refer to 





Table 5: The Determinants of Voice at the Workplace, WERS 1998. 
 


















































































Hotels and restaurants -0.01 
(-0.12) 
Transport and communication -0.07 
(-0.72) 
Financial services -0.06 
(1.08) 














Other community services 0.02 
(0.18) 





Notes: Items in [  ] refer to omitted reference category. Linear estimation of the dependent 
variable voice (0,1).  The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point change in voice 
adoption based on falling into one of our dependent categorical variable classifications.  





Table 6: The Determinants of HRM Intensity at the Workplace, WERS 1998.  
 Dependent variable:  
High HRM Score Dummy  
[Probit Estimates] 
Dependent variable:  
HRM Score 
[OLS] 
Dep. Var. Mean 0.43 6.89 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
1. Type of Voice [No Voice]     
Union only -0.44 -1.25 -0.14 -0.39 
Non-Union only  0.52  1.97 0.59 1.93 
Dual Channel  0.58  2.41 0.67 2.56 
 
2. Public Sector [Private] 
-0.17 -0.78 -0.02 -0.05 
 
3. Foreign Owned [Domestic] 
 0.32  1.60  0.09  0.27 
Joint-Venture -0.36 -3.45 -1.91 -3.48 
 
4. Family Owned or controlled [Other] 
-0.60 -3.22 -0.56 -2.34 
 
5. Franchise [Non-Franchise] 
-0.04 -0.12 -0.21 -0.43 
5. Workplace Size [10-24 employees]     
25-49 0.06 0.39  0.08 0.44 
50-99 0.15 1.00  0.36 1.76 
100-199 0.42 2.82  0.81 3.77 
200-499 0.57 3.70  0.94 4.17 
500+ 0.60 3.29  1.13 4.28 
 
6. Size of  Establishment Network [Single] 
    
2-10  0.46  2.50 1.46 5.39 
11-50 -0.03 -0.98 0.40 1.47 
51+  0.57  3.38 0.88 3.90 
 
8. Age of Establishment [21+ yrs] 
    
10-20 0.24 1.49 0.51 2.31 
5-9 0.22 1.20 0.53 2.30 
3-4 0.51 2.13 0.94 2.96 
<3 0.22 0.93 0.22 0.70 
 
9. Number of Organizational Affiliations [None] 
    
One  0.02  0.13 0.03 0.21 
Two  0.23  1.29 0.42 1.68 
Three  0.52  1.94 0.75 1.88 
Four  -0.15 -0.46 0.98 1.71 
10. Industry [Wholesale and retail]     
Manufacturing -0.65 -2.72 -0.94 -2.75 
Electricity, gas and water  0.72 2.16 1.11 2.38 
Construction -0.88 -3.08 -1.52 -3.52 
Hotels and restaurants -0.36 -1.20 -1.07 -2.66 
Transport and communication -0.11 -0.32 -0.37 -1.05 
Financial services -0.05 -0.19 0.59 1.65 
Other business services -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 
Public administration -0.01 -0.01 -0.54 -0.97 
Education -0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.44 
Health  0.33 1.23 0.29 0.80 
Other community services -0.32 -1.13 -1.49 -2.99 
11. Intercept -1.00 -3.54 6.97 18.68 
Observations 1583  1583  
F-stat/R-squared 5.62  0.32  





















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13












Non-Voice [5.7]  
Voice [7.3] 
 36 
Figure 2: Frequency of HRM Scores by Voice Type For British Workplaces (the 
dotted line showing the distribution of HRM for all workplaces) 
 
Panel A: Workplaces With Union Voice Only [6.4] 
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